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Abstract: 
 
We discuss the authors’ conceptualization of replication, in particular the false dichotomy of 
direct versus conceptual replication intrinsic to it, and suggest a broader one that better 
generalizes to other domains of psychological research. We also discuss their approach to the 
evaluation of replication results and suggest moving beyond their dichotomous statistical 
paradigms and employing hierarchical / meta-analytic statistical models. 
 
Main Text: 
 
We thank Zwaan et al. (2018; hereafter ZELD) for their review paper on replication and strongly 
endorse their call to make replication mainstream. Nonetheless, we find their conceptualization 
of and recommendations for replication problematic. 
 
Intrinsic to ZELD’s conceptualization is a false dichotomy of direct versus conceptual 
replication, with the former defined as “a study that attempts to recreate the critical elements 
(e.g., samples, procedures, and measures) of an original study” (p. 8) and the latter as a “study 
where there are changes to the original procedures that might make a difference with regard to 
the observed effect size” (p. 9). We see problems with both of ZELD’s definitions and the sharp 
dichotomization intrinsic to their conceptualization. 
 
In terms of definitions, first, ZELD punt in defining direct replications by leaving unspecified the 
crucial matter of what constitutes the “critical elements of an original study.” Specifying these is 
nontrivial if not impossible in general and likely controversial in specific. Second, they are 
overly broad in defining conceptual replications: under their definition, practically all behavioral 
research replication studies would be considered conceptual. To understand why, consider large-
scale replication projects such as the Many Labs project (Klein et al., 2014) and Registered 
Replication Reports (RRRs; Simons et al., 2014) where careful measures were taken such that 
protocols were followed identically across labs in order to achieve near exact or direct 
replication; even under such strict conditions, effect sizes did indeed differ (i.e., are 
heterogeneous or contextually variable) across labs and to roughly the same degree as sampling 
variation (McShane, et al., 2016; Stanley et al., 2017). This renders ZELD’s suggestion of 
conducting direct replication infeasible: even if defining the “critical elements” were possible, 
recreating them in a manner that maintains the effect size homogeneity they insist on for direct 
replication seems impossible.  
 
In addition, and also due to these Many Labs and RRR results, the sharp dichotomization of 
direct versus conceptual replication intrinsic to ZELD’s conceptualization is unrealistic in 
practice. Further, even were it not, replication designs with hybrid elements (e.g., where the 
theoretical level is “directly” replicated but the operationalization is systematically varied) are an 
important future direction—particularly for large-scale replication projects (Tackett, et al., 
2017b)—not covered by ZELD’s conceptualization.  
 
Instead, and in line with ZELD’s mention of “extensions,” we would like to see a broader 
approach to conceptualizing replication, and in particular one that better generalizes to other 
domains of psychological research. Specifically, large-scale replications are typically only 
possible when data collection is fast and not particularly costly, and thus they are, practically 
speaking, constrained to certain domains of psychology (e.g., cognitive and social). 
Consequently, we know much less about the replicability of findings in other domains (e.g., 
clinical and developmental) let alone how to operationalize replicability in them (Tackett et al., 
2017a; Tackett, Brandes, & Reardon, 2018). In these other domains, where data collection is 
slow and costly but individual datasets are typically much richer, we recommend that rather than 
taking a prospective approach to replication, a retrospective approach that leverages the large 
amount of shareable archival data across sites is not only valuable but also potentially preferable 
(Tackett et al., 2017b; Tackett et al., 2018). 
 
This will require not only a change in both infrastructure and incentive structures but also a 
better understanding of appropriate statistical approaches for analyzing pooled data (i.e., 
hierarchical models) and more complex effects (e.g., curve or function estimates as opposed to 
point estimates); lab-specific moderators most relevant to include in such analyses; additional 
method factors that drive heterogeneity (e.g., drop out mechanisms in longitudinal studies); and 
how to harmonize measurements across labs (e.g., if they use different measures of depression).  
 
It may also require an overhaul of what constitutes a replication. ZELD suggest three ways of 
statistically evaluating a replication, all of which are based on the null hypothesis significance 
testing (NHST) paradigm and the dichotomous p-value thresholds intrinsic to it. Such thresholds, 
whether in the form of p-values or other statistical measures such as confidence intervals and 
Bayes Factors, (i) lead to erroneous reasoning (McShane and Gal, 2016, 2017), (ii) are a form of 
statistical alchemy that falsely promise to transmute randomness into certainty (Gelman, 2016) 
thereby permitting dichotomous declarations of truth or falsity, binary statements about there 
being “an effect” or “no effect,” a “successful replication” or a “failed replication”, and (iii) 
should be abandoned (McShane et al., 2017; McShane and Gelman, 2017). 
 
Instead, we would like to see replication efforts statistically evaluated via hierarchical / meta-
analytic statistical models. Such models can directly estimate and account for contextual 
variability (i.e, heterogeneity) in replication efforts, which is critically important given, as per the 
Many Labs and RRR results, that such variability is roughly comparable to sampling variability 
even when explicit efforts are taken to minimize it and is typically many times larger in more 
standard sets of studies when they are not (van Erp, et al., 2017; Stanley et al., 2017). 
Importantly, they can also account for differences in methods factors such as dependent 
variables, moderators, and study designs (McShane and Bockenholt, 2017a, 2017b) and for 
varying treatment effects (Gelman, 2015) thereby allowing for a much richer characterization of 
a research domain and application to the hybrid replication designs discussed above. We would 
also like to see the estimates from these models considered alongside additional factors such as 
prior and related evidence, plausibility of mechanism, study design and data quality in order to 
provide a more holistic evaluation of replication efforts. 
 
Our suggestions for replication conceptualization and evaluation forsake the false promise of 
certainty offered by the dichotomous approaches favored by the field and by ZELD. 
Consequently, they will seldom if ever deem a replication effort a “success” or a “failure” and 
indeed reasonable people following them may disagree about the degree of replication success. 
However, by accepting uncertainty and embracing variation (Carlin, 2016; Gelman, 2016), we 
believe these suggestions will help us learn much more about the world. 
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